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1. INTRODUCTION
THE review of the gravity model by Anderson (2011) credits Ravenstein (1885, 1889),for pioneering the use of gravity to model migration patterns,1 long before the semi-
nal contribution of Tinbergen (1962) who estimated a gravity equation of international
trade ﬂows. Trade economists have explored since then, albeit in a discontinuous way
(Head and Mayer, 2015), the theoretical foundations of gravity models of trade, while the
interest towards gravity models of migration has only recently regained momentum
because of an enhanced availability of migration data, particularly of dyadic (origin–
destination) nature.
We rely on data from €Ozden et al. (2011) and World Bank (2013) to plot the decadal vari-
ations between 1960 and 2010 in migrant stocks, which have been used in the literature as a
proxy for migration ﬂows, along four main corridors. Figure 1 reveals how the dynamics of
international migration drastically varies across corridors, strengthening the case for using
dyadic data to analyse its determinants.
This paper is meant to represent a practitioners’ guide to dyadic gravity models of migra-
tion, with three distinct but closely interconnected objectives. Section 2 analyses where the lit-
erature stands with respect to the effort to lay out the theoretical basis for the estimation of
gravity equations through random utility maximisation (RUM) models, and which are the
implications of the different micro-foundations for the speciﬁcation of the equation that is
brought to the data. Section 3 provides an overview of the main challenges connected to the
estimation of gravity equations and to the interpretations of the results. In this respect, we
focus on papers devoted to the analysis of the scale of migration ﬂows or rates and disregard
papers dealing with selection or sorting issues. Section 4 reviews the evidence that has been
produced by the estimation of theory-based gravity equations. The paper then concludes with
Section 5.
The authors are grateful to the guest editor Frederic Docquier, to Tobias M€uller and to an anonymous
referee for their accurate reading of our paper. We also thank other participants in the Conference on
‘International labour mobility and inequality across nations’ held in Clermont Ferrand in January 2014;
this paper beneﬁted from the ﬁnancial support of the FERDI (Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches
sur le Developpement International) and of the programme ‘Investissements d’Avenir’ (ANR 10 LABX
14 01) of the French government; Jesus Fernandez Huertas Moraga received ﬁnancial support from the
ECO2008 04785 and ECO2012 39412 projects funded by the Spanish Ministry for Economics and
Competitiveness. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 Niedercorn and Bechdolt (1969) quote Carey (1858) as an even earlier source.
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2. MICRO FOUNDATIONS
a. Bilateral Migration Gross Flows
Let sjt represent the stock of the population residing in country j at time t; we can write an
accounting identity for the scale mjkt of the migration ﬂow from country j to country k at time t:
mjkt ¼ pjktsjt; (1)
where pjkt 2 ½0; 1 represents the actual share of individuals residing in j who move to k at
time t. The migration literature has relied on RUM models that describe the location decision
problem that individuals face to derive the expected value of pjkt.
b. A RUM Model of Migration
The canonical RUM model of migration describes the utility that individual i who was
located in country j at time t1 derives from opting for country k belonging to the choice set
D at time t as:
Uijkt ¼ wjkt  cjkt þ ijkt; (2)
where wjkt represents a deterministic component of utility and cjkt denotes the time-speciﬁc cost
of moving from j to k, which can be both modelled as a function of variables that are observed
by the econometrician, and ijkt is an individual-speciﬁc stochastic term. The distributional
Years
Variations in Stocks (millions)
?
?
??
??
??
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????
???????????
???????????
???????????
FIGURE 1
Variations in Migrant Stocks Along Four Main Corridors
Note:
The partition of countries between the North and the South follows Ozden et al. (2011); the data referring to a decade
are the variation in stocks with respect to the previous decade.
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Ozden et al. (2011) and World Bank (2013).
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assumptions on ijkt determine the expected probability that opting for country k represents the
utility-maximising choice of individual i. If we assume that ijkt follows an independent and
identically distributed extreme value type 1 distribution (McFadden, 1974), then:
EðpjktÞ ¼ e
wjkt cjktP
l2D ewjlt cjlt
: (3)
This allows us to rewrite the expected gross migration ﬂow from country j to country k as
follows:
EðmjktÞ ¼ e
wjkt cjktP
l2D ewjlt cjlt
sjt: (4)
If we assume that the deterministic component of utility does not vary with the origin j, then
we can rewrite (4) in a way that makes evident why this closely resembles to a gravity equation:
EðmjktÞ ¼ /jkt
ykt
Xjt
sjt; (5)
where ykt ¼ ewkt , /jkt ¼ e cjkt and Xjt ¼
P
l2D /jltylt. The expected migration ﬂow in (5) depends
in a multiplicative way on (i) the ability sjt of the origin j to send out migrants, (ii) the attractive-
ness ykt of destination k, (iii) on the accessibility /jkt  1 of destination k for potential migrants
from j, and it is inversely related to (iv) Xjt, which represents the exponentiated value of the
expected utility of prospective migrants from the choice situation (Small and Rosen, 1981).2
We can immediately observe that @Xjt=@/jlt ¼ ylt[ 0, so that a reduction in the accessibility
of an alternative destination l invariably leads to an increase in the expected bilateral migration
ﬂow from j to k in (5). This, in turn, implies that we can extend to migration ﬂows the thought
experiment about trade ﬂows proposed by Krugman (1995): if we imagine moving two European
countries to Mars while keeping their attractiveness and bilateral accessibility unchanged, then
the migration ﬂows between the two countries would deﬁnitely increase.
If we take the ratio between EðmjktÞ and the corresponding expression for the expected
number of stayers, normalising /jjt to one, we have that:
EðmjktÞ
EðmjjtÞ ¼ /jkt
ykt
yjt
: (6)
This ratio depends only on the attractiveness of destination k and of the origin j, and on
the accessibility /jkt, while both Xjt and sjt cancel out. This represents a manifestation of the
well-known property of the independence from irrelevant alternatives that follows from the
distributional assumptions a la McFadden (1974) on the stochastic term in (2): a variation in
the attractiveness or in the accessibility of an alternative destination induces an identical pro-
portional change in both EðmjktÞ and EðmjjtÞ, thus leaving (6) unchanged.
Bringing (5) to the data requires adding a well-behaved error term gjkt, with EðgjktÞ ¼ 1, to
it, so that:
mjkt ¼ /jkt
ykt
Xjt
sjtgjkt: (7)
2 Xjt also captures the deterministic component of utility of not migrating, that is, opting for the
origin j.
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The elegance and tractability of this model have made it the canonical reference in the
migration literature, but it might be exposed to problems related to (i) the adequacy of the
distributional assumption on the stochastic term and (ii) the speciﬁcation of the deterministic
component of utility. We are going to explore each of these two points in turn.
(i) Distributional Assumptions on the Stochastic Component
The derivation of (5) is based on the assumptions that the attractiveness of destination k
varies neither across origin countries nor across individuals and that the stochastic compo-
nent of utility is iid EVT-1. The hypotheses on the stochastic component can be regarded
as ‘the natural outcome of a well-speciﬁed model that captures all sources of correlation
over alternatives into representative utility’ (Train, 2003, p. 76), but the restrictive assump-
tions on the deterministic component of utility jeopardise the chances that the model is well
speciﬁed.
Imagine, for instance, that destination countries differ with respect to the gender gap in
wages: the assumption that the deterministic component of utility does not vary with gender
is going to introduce a positive correlation in the stochastic component of utility for a woman
across countries characterised by a similar gender gap in wages. Individuals could be also het-
erogeneous with respect to the psychic costs of migration to any destination (Sjaastad, 1962),
and this would introduce a positive correlation in the stochastic component of utility across
all countries but the origin (Ortega and Peri, 2013).
What happens if we introduce more general distributional assumptions, allowing for a cor-
relation in the stochastic component of utility in (2) across different alternatives in the choice
set? We can draw on Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) to generalise (5):
EðmjktÞ ¼ /1=sjkt
y
1=s
kt
Xjkt
sjt; (8)
where the parameter s in (8) is inversely related to the correlation in the stochastic component
of utility across alternatives. A key difference between (5) and (8) is that the resistance term
Xjkt in the latter equation varies with the destination k, with the functional form of Xjkt
depending on the different distributional assumptions that are adopted (Bertoli and Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 2013; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga,
2015).3 This, in turn, implies that the resistance term no longer cancels out when we take the
ratio between two different expected migration ﬂows:4
EðmjktÞ
EðmjjtÞ ¼ /
1=s
jkt
y
1=s
kt
yjt
Xjjt
Xjkt
: (9)
More general distributional assumptions, which are more consistent with the constraints
imposed on the speciﬁcation of the deterministic component of utility, no longer satisfy the
3 Speciﬁcally, the distributional assumptions introduced by Ortega and Peri (2013), which capture the
idea that agents have heterogeneous preferences for migration with the introduction of an individual spe
ciﬁc stochastic component of utility that is common to all locations except the origin, imply that Xjkt
does not vary with k 2 D/{j}, but it nevertheless entails that EðmjktÞ=EðmjjtÞ does not uniquely depend
on the attractiveness of k and j and on the accessibility /jkt.
4 This expression is derived under the assumption, which is maintained in the literature (Beine et al.,
2013; Bertoli and Fernandez Huertas Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 2013; Bertoli and Fernandez
Huertas Moraga, 2015), that the origin country has no close substitute in the choice set.
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independence from irrelevant alternatives property: speciﬁcally, an increase in the attractive-
ness of a destination that is perceived as a close substitute to k, will reduce EðmjktÞ more than
EðmjjtÞ (Bertoli et al., 2013b), thus inducing a decline in (9). This, in turn, questions the long-
standing tradition in the migration literature of estimating the determinants of bilateral migra-
tion rates as a function of the attractiveness of j and k only (Hanson, 2010). A second key dif-
ference between (5) and (8) is that the bilateral accessibility /jkt and the attractiveness ykt are
raised to the power of 1/s, with implications for the interpretation of the estimated coefﬁcients
that will be discussed in Section 3d.
(ii) The Speciﬁcation of the Deterministic Component of Utility
The canonical RUM model of migration is surprisingly silent about the time dimension of
the location decision problem that potential migrants face. The inclusion of a time subscript t
in (2) suggests that individuals make repeated location choices during the course of their life-
times. For instance, an individual who decided to migrate at time t might decide in a follow-
ing period to return to their origin country or to move on to another destination. Similarly, an
individual who found optimal not to change their location at time t could still consider mov-
ing at a later point in time.
These simple observations call for rewriting location-speciﬁc utility in a way that explicitly
reﬂects the sequential nature of the location decision problem, following the literature on
dynamic discrete choice models (Artuc et al., 2010; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011; Kennan
and Walker, 2011):
Uijkt ¼ wkt þ bVtþ1ðkÞ  cjkt þ ijkt; (10)
where b ≤ 1 represents a discount factor, and Vtþ1ðkÞ is the expected value of the optimal
sequence of moves from time t + 1 onwards, conditional upon being located in country k at
time t. The speciﬁcation of utility in (10) reveals that the deterministic component of the
attractiveness of country k at time t is wkt þ bVtþ1ðkÞ,5 and it thus depends also on (i) the
future attractiveness of all locations in the choice set and (ii) the future values of the whole
matrix of bilateral accessibility parameters.
We can observe, following Bertoli et al. (2013a), that (10) reduces to (2) only if we
assume either that individuals take myopic decisions, that is, b = 0, or that we live in a fric-
tionless world with no migration costs,6 so that Vtþ1ðkÞ does not vary with k and there is no
path dependence in migration decisions.
If we derive the expression for the expected bilateral migration rate from (10) while main-
taining the assumption that ijkt is iid EVT-1, then we have (Bertoli et al., 2013a):
EðmjktÞ ¼ /jkt
ykt
XVjt
ebVtþ1ðkÞsjt; (11)
where the resistance term XVjt is given by
P
l2D /jltylte
bVtþ1ðlÞ, and it does not vary with k. If
we take the ratio between the expected number of migrants to k and the expected number of
stayers at time t, we obtain:
5 Notice that wkt þ bVtþ1ðkÞ does not represent the present discounted value of the expected stream of
wks, with s ≥ t+1.
6 This represents a theoretically interesting limiting case, as in Anderson (2011), but certainly not a
good approximation of the real world.
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EðmjktÞ
EðmjjtÞ ¼ /jkt
ykt
yjt
eb Vtþ1ðkÞ Vtþ1ðjÞ½ : (12)
The expression in (12) reveals that even the traditional distributional assumptions
a la McFadden (1974) do not allow to express this ratio just as a function of the current
attractiveness of j and k and of the accessibility /jkt, as (12) is sensitive to variations in the
future attractiveness of alternative destinations (Bertoli et al., 2013a).
3. CHALLENGES FOR THE ESTIMATION
a. What is the Origin of the Migrant?
An international migrant can be deﬁned as ‘any person who changes his or her country
of usual residence’ (United Nations, 1998), but the measures of the bilateral gross
migration ﬂows mjkt often depart from this deﬁnition. Speciﬁcally, the origin j can be
deﬁned as (i) the country of birth, (ii) the country of citizenship or (iii) the country of last
residence of the migrant. These three criteria partly overlap, but do not coincide, because
of naturalisations and of repeated migration episodes. Existing data sources rarely provide
information on more than one of the criteria (i)–(iii), so that, say, data on bilateral migra-
tion ﬂows based on the country of birth j aggregate the migration decisions of individuals
who are citizens and that resided in countries other than j. The adoption of one of these
three criteria, which is often data-driven, presents some advantages and limitations. For
instance, some dyadic determinants of migration costs, such as visa waivers, depend on
citizenship, while linguistic proximity could depend more closely on the country of birth
and economic conditions in the country of last residence could shape the incentives to
move. This type of measurement error contributes to departing from the iid assumption in
Section 2b(i).
b. The Empirical Counterpart for the Log Odds
The RUM model analysed in Section 2 implies that the logarithm of the odds of migrating
to country k over staying in country j in (6) can be expressed as a linear function of the dif-
ferential in the deterministic component of utility associated with the two countries. Ideally,
the empirical counterpart of the log odds would be represented by the ratio between the gross
ﬂow of migrants from j to k observed on a certain time period7 over the number of individu-
als who remained in j throughout the period.
As far as the numerator of this ratio is concerned, gross ﬂows have been used by Mayda
(2010), Ortega and Peri (2013), Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013), McKenzie
et al. (2014) and Bertoli et al. (2013a). Other papers have used a proxy for the gross ﬂows
represented by the variations in migration stocks (Beine et al., 2011a; Beine and Parsons,
2015; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2015). A limitation is that variations in stocks
differ from gross ﬂows as they are also inﬂuenced by return migration, migration to third
countries, deaths and naturalisations (if the deﬁnition of immigrants is based on citizenship)
7 The length of the time period also represents a crucial analytical choice: longer time periods, such as
a decade, create problems for the (implicit) assumption in the RUM model that the deterministic compo
nent of location speciﬁc utility in (2) does not vary within the period.
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and births (if the country of destination adopts the ius sanguinis).8 Furthermore, while mjkt is
by deﬁnition non-negative, variations in stocks can take negative values, which have been
excluded from the sample (Beine et al., 2011a), set to zero (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga, 2015) or added to the proxy for the ﬂow from k to j (Beine and Parsons, 2015).
Grogger and Hanson (2011), Llull (2011) and Belot and Hatton (2012) have used stocks for
the numerator, but this choice creates a tension with the underlying micro-foundation of the
gravity equation, unless one assumes a frictionless world.
For the denominator, the size of population at origin has been used (Bertoli and Fernan-
dez-Huertas Moraga, 2015), possibly restricted to certain age cohorts (Bertoli et al., 2013a),
but this also includes immigrants, or the number of natives at origin (Beine and Parsons,
2015), which represents a superior alternative as it only includes stayers and returnees. A con-
venient alternative, for data sets that include multiple destinations, is represented by the inclu-
sion of origin-time dummies djt that control for the denominator of the dependent variable,
although this choice comes at a cost that is discussed in Section 3d below.
c. Multilateral Resistance to Migration
Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) deﬁne multilateral resistance to migration as
the confounding inﬂuence that the attractiveness of alternative destinations exerts on the bilat-
eral migration rate. Section 2 follows Bertoli et al. (2013a) and shows how multilateral resis-
tance to migration can arise either from more general distributional assumptions on the
stochastic component in (2), or from explicitly accounting for the sequential nature of migra-
tion decisions.
Ignoring the term Xjkt in (9) generates biases in the estimation of the coefﬁcients of the deter-
minants of migration. For example, both Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) and
Bertoli et al. (2013a) ﬁnd that the effect of economic conditions at origin on migration rates is
overestimated when the inﬂuence of alternative destinations is ignored. The reason is that econ-
omic conditions can be positively correlated between origins and alternative destinations, both
over time and space. Thus, when alternative destinations are disregarded, the origin term wjt
picks up both its own effect and the effect of these alternative destinations that goes through
Xjkt. The scope for large biases is even more pronounced when migration policies are consid-
ered. Given that migration policies tend to be coordinated among destination countries, for
example within the Schengen area, it is not surprising that studies controlling for multilateral
resistance to migration tend to ﬁnd much larger policy effects than studies that do not control at
all (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, 2013; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga,
2015). This happens even in the case of empirical strategies that only control for Xjkt under less
general distributional assumptions (Ortega and Peri, 2013; Beine and Parsons, 2015).
Different authors have proposed different strategies to control for Xjkt. When the panel and
longitudinal dimension of the data set are large enough, the resistance term nicely conforms
with the structure of the CCE estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). This is the methodology
used by Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) and Bertoli et al. (2013a), and it has the
additional advantage of being robust even in the presence of residual cross-sectional dependence
in the data (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). Using less data-demanding approaches, Ortega and Peri
8 A distinct advantage of variations in stocks is that they can allow to obtain (a proxy for) migration
ﬂow data disaggregated by education although the study of selection and sorting is out of the scope of
this paper.
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(2013) control for the multilateral resistance to migration that is induced by an heterogeneity in
the preference for migration, so that Xjkt does not vary across destinations k except the origin j
itself. This empirically corresponds to estimating the gravity equation with origin-year dummies
djt. Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015) go one step further and assume that potential
migrants are heterogeneous in their preferences towards subsets (nests) of destination. With
their cross-sectional data, this speciﬁc form of Xjkt can be controlled for with origin-nest dum-
mies. Finally, Beine and Parsons (2015) use destination-year dummies dkt, which allow them to
partly control for the dynamic resistance terms introduced in Section 2b(ii).
Whether any of these alternative approaches or even the classical one that ignores multilat-
eral resistance to migration altogether is enough to generate unbiased estimates is ultimately
an empirical question. Following the theory, one necessary condition for the estimates to be
RUM-consistent is to make sure that their residuals are cross-sectionally independent. In this
sense, Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015) propose adapting the CD test by Pesaran
(2004) to verify that Xjkt is properly controlled for.
d. Estimates and Structural Parameters of the RUM Model
Using a micro-founded model with more general distributional assumptions comes at a cost
in terms of the interpretation of the coefﬁcients. As discussed in Section 2b(i) above, general-
ising the distributional assumptions on ijkt in (2) implies that the estimation of the gravity
equations does not identify the vector of structural parameters that relate the attractiveness wkt
and the accessibility /jkt of a destination to the vectors of observed determinants, but the ratio
between this vector and the dissimilarity parameter s. Aggregate migration data do not neces-
sarily allow to separately identify s, which inﬂuences the elasticity of bilateral migration ﬂows
with respect to each of the determinants of wkt and /jkt (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga, 2015). One can rely on the fact that s 2 (0,1] and that the elasticities are monotonic
functions of s to construct bounds for the elasticities of interest, following Schmidheiny and
Br€ulhart (2011). The inclusion of origin-time dummies djt among the regressors
9 implies that
the estimates are consistent with a RUM model that is not based on distributional assumptions
a la McFadden (1974), so that the fundamental uncertainty in the estimated elasticities should
always be considered.
e. Estimation in Logs or in Levels
The pseudo-gravity model of migration derived from the underlying RUM model can be
estimated using as the dependent variable either the level of the bilateral gross migration ﬂow
in (7), or the empirical counterpart qjkt of the ratio of choice probabilities in (6). This second
option requires estimating, through OLS, the following equation:
qjkt ¼ lnð/jktÞ þ lnðyktÞ  lnðyjtÞ þ ln
gjkt
gjjt
 !
: (13)
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) made the point that the assumption that EðgjktÞ ¼ 1 does
not imply that E ln gjkt=gjjt
   ¼ 0, and that the heteroscedasticity of gjkt entails that the
9 See, for instance, Beine et al. (2011a), Ortega and Peri (2013) and McKenzie et al. (2014) for differ
ent justiﬁcations for the inclusion of these dummies.
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expected value of ln gjkt=gjjt
 
in (13) will be a function of the value of the regressors, thus
making OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. This, in turn, calls for relying on the bilateral
gross migration ﬂow as the dependent variable as in (7), and estimating the model with Pois-
son pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). This choice always requires including origin-time
dummies among the regressors, to control for the resistance term Xjt and for the number of
potential migrants sjt, while the inclusion of these dummies is, as discussed in Section 2b, not
strictly necessary when estimating (13).10
The choice of the estimation technique for the gravity model of migration confronts the
researcher with an important trade-off: the reliance on linear models through the logarithmic
transformation widens the menu of estimators that can be adopted, as discussed in Section 3b,
to deal with multilateral resistance to migration, while Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga
(2015) represents, to date, the only paper that deals with multilateral resistance to migration
with PPML under more general distributional assumptions than Ortega and Peri (2013)11
through a richer structure of ﬁxed effects. Also, since PPML requires the use of origin-time
dummies, it is not possible to identify origin-time effects, such as the effect of income at ori-
gin, while the logarithmic transformation makes this feasible.
(i) Presence of Zeros in the Data
The case for relying on PPML is strengthened when the dependent variable takes zero val-
ues, as Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) have shown that this estimator performs well even
in the presence of a large share of zeros in the data.12 An alternative to linear models is repre-
sented by a two-stage selection model a la Heckman adopted by Beine et al. (2011a). Identiﬁ-
cation is improved by the availability of a variable that can be excluded from the second-
stage equation, but credible exclusion restrictions are hard to ﬁnd with data that have a longi-
tudinal dimension.
f. Omitted Variables and Instrumentation
The existence of omitted variables drives a wedge between wkt and cjkt in (2) and their
empirical counterparts. This calls for estimation approaches that are consistent with more gen-
eral distributional assumptions on ijkt in (2), as omitted variables end up in the error term
and can give rise to a correlation in the stochastic component of utility across destinations
(Train, 2003). Controlling for multilateral resistance to migration can make instrumentation
unnecessary as long as the endogeneity problem is not due to reverse causality, or as long as
the resistance terms capture a big part of the omitted factors.
If the two above conditions do not apply, instrumentation of some of the key variables
might be needed. Three issues arise in that respect. The ﬁrst issue is, of course, the search for
a valid instrument, which is not trivial. The presence of serial correlation in the error term of
speciﬁcation (4) invalidates the use of internal instruments, that is, past bilateral ﬂows in a
panel set-up. This means that external instruments should be favoured. For instance, networks
10 The estimation of (13) with the CCE estimator proposed by Bertoli and Fernandez Huertas Moraga
(2013) allows to deal with heteroscedastic disturbances in (7).
11 PPML estimates are always consistent with heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate when origin
time dummies are included.
12 The estimation of the reduced sample of non zero observations or with scaled OLS gives rise to large
biases (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).
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are clearly endogenous in equation (4). Endogeneity might come from omitted variables, for
example networks are correlated with unobserved cultural proximity, but in some cases also
from some kind of reverse causality, for example, ﬂows are computed from variations in
stocks, which represent the macro proxy of the size of networks. To that purpose, Beine et al.
(2011a) use the past existence of bilateral guest worker programmes at destination to
instrument for networks.
A second issue is that instrumentation preferably needs to take place in a Poisson regression
set up, as discussed in Section 3e above. Tenreyro (2007) proposes to combine PPML estima-
tion and instrumentation using a GMM type of estimator. Beine et al. (2014) implement that
approach in the context of international migration of students. Nevertheless, the estimation
might face in practice important problems of convergence towards the optimal values of the
estimates and one cannot rule out the existence of local maxima in the support of admissible
values for the key parameters. Finally, if multilateral resistance to migration is still an issue, the
instrumentation procedure should ideally account for it, both in the ﬁrst and in the second stage.
4. SOME RUM BASED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The attractiveness wjkt of a country for potential migrants from j and the bilateral migration
costs cjkt are usually modelled as linear functions of two (possibly overlapping) vectors of
variables, which can vary over all combinations of the origin (j), destination (k) and time (t)
dimension. We acknowledge our review is far from being exhaustive. In particular, we review
some existing empirical evidence on the determinants of international migration ﬂows (and
rates) derived from the estimation of gravity models with dyadic data based on an underlying
RUM model.
a. Origin or Destination-speciﬁc Factors
(i) Income
A key determinant of the attractiveness wkt of each location is represented by its level of
income per capita. A RUM-based model of migration does not impose any constraint on the
functional form of the relationship between income per capita and the deterministic compo-
nent of location-speciﬁc utility in (2). Grogger and Hanson (2011) favour a speciﬁcation
where wkt depends linearly on income per capita, while other papers in the literature opt for a
logarithmic speciﬁcation (Mayda, 2010; Bertoli et al., 2013b; Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas
Moraga, 2013; Ortega and Peri, 2013; McKenzie et al., 2014).13 The literature generally
assumes that the income prospects of potential migrants from all origins can be measured
through GDP per capita at destination,14 thus mostly imposing the assumption of a common
trend in migrants’ earnings at destination, with Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013)
representing an exception in this respect, and also minimising the concerns about reverse cau-
sality. Reﬁnements have been proposed by Grogger and Hanson (2011), which apply country-
speciﬁc income tax schedules to obtain measures of post-tax earnings, Grogger and Hanson
(2011) and Belot and Hatton (2012), which recover education-speciﬁc earnings, and by Beine
et al. (2013), which focus on wages rather than on earnings. The empirical evidence points to
13 This choice is also related to the modelling of credit constraints, which is discussed in Section 4a(ii).
14 We have relied on this common practice for the derivation of (5).
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a robust positive relationship between income per capita and wkt, with variations in earnings
at destination that exert a stronger inﬂuence on the bilateral migration rate than identical pro-
portional variations at origin in estimates that are consistent with departures from the standard
distributional assumptions (Bertoli et al., 2013b).15
(ii) Credit Constraints
The canonical RUM model of migration with distributional assumptions a la McFadden
(1974) implies that a simultaneous identical variation in the (logarithm of) income per capita
at origin and at destination does not inﬂuence the bilateral migration rate. Such a perfect sym-
metry disappears if we consider that potential migrants might face credit constraints that hin-
der their location choices. Credit constraints can be accommodated into the model by
assuming that bilateral migration costs cjkt are negatively correlated with income at origin and
hence with wjt. If the dependency of bilateral migration costs on economic conditions at ori-
gin is not properly controlled for, then an increase in incomes at origin would reduce the
bilateral migration rate less than an identical decrease at destination, and it might even expand
the scale of bilateral migration ﬂows. The role of credit constraints has thus been captured
either through the inclusion higher-order terms of income at origin (Vogler and Rotte, 2000;
Clark et al., 2007; Pedersen et al., 2008; Mayda, 2010), controlling for the incidence of pov-
erty at origin (Belot and Hatton, 2012) or splitting the sample as a function of income at ori-
gin (Ortega and Peri, 2013).16 The econometric evidence provided by Vogler and Rotte
(2000), Clark et al. (2007), Pedersen et al. (2008) and Belot and Hatton (2012) suggests that
credit constraints do hinder observed international migration ﬂows, blurring the effect of
income if not properly controlled for (Belot and Hatton, 2012).
(iii) Expectations
The sequential model of migration that we summarised in Section 2b(ii) implies that the
current bilateral migration rate depends on the expectations about the evolution of economic
conditions in all countries belonging to the choice set. Bertoli et al. (2013a) have recently
provided econometric evidence on the highly signiﬁcant role of expectations in driving bilat-
eral migration ﬂows to Germany between 2006 and 2012. Variations in expectations about the
future attractiveness of the origin country can inﬂuence current migration decisions even after
controlling for traditional determinants of the current attractiveness of a country. Furthermore,
when the confounding inﬂuence exerted by the future attractiveness of alternative destinations
is not controlled for, the estimates of the effect of current labour market conditions at origin
are signiﬁcantly upward biased.
(iv) General Immigration Policies
Migration costs cjkt can be, at least partly, policy-induced. The immigration policies
adopted by the country of destination can be either general, that is, addressed to all countries
15 The heterogeneity of the approaches, in terms of wage data, speciﬁcations and data frequencies,
prevents us from presenting some clear cut result in terms of elasticities. For instance, Grogger and Han
son (2011) focus on the skill ratio rather than on migration ﬂows. Using annual data of wage compensa
tions, Beine et al. (2013) obtain an elasticity around 0.8, implying that an increase in the wage
differential of 1 per cent boosts the bilateral migration ﬂow by slightly less than 1 per cent.
16 The inclusion of origin time dummies djt also allows to purge the estimated effect of income
per capita on location speciﬁc utility from the possible dependency of cjkt on wjt.
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of origin, or bilateral. We analyse here evidence on general immigration policies, while bilat-
eral policies are dealt with in Section 4b(ii). Limited progress has been made on the measure-
ment of policy-induced migration costs compared to the existing data sources on tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). Early attempts have been pro-
vided by Clark et al. (2007), Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2013). In particular, Ortega
and Peri (2013) analyse the role of general immigration policies in a micro-founded gravity
model as in (8). The key policy measure, which represents an extension of Mayda (2010),
refers to an index of entry tightness over the period 1980–2006 for 15 OECD countries. This
index, which is not comparable across destinations, is negatively associated with the scale of
incoming migration ﬂows in estimates where between-destination variability is not used for
identiﬁcation. An attempt to build measures of immigration policies that are comparable both
between countries and over time is represented by the ongoing IMPALA project, which aims
at building a database based on immigration laws in the 26 most important destination
countries.17 While progress has been made on this front, we are nevertheless very far away from
a full-ﬂedged usable database in the estimation of gravity models. In the absence of satisfying
measures on immigration, one can nevertheless make use of the panel dimension and include dkt
ﬁxed effects that control for the inﬂuence of general immigration policies, as in Beine et al.
(2011a), Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015) and Beine and Parsons (2015).
(v) Environmental Factors
There is a very substantial empirical literature on the impact of environmental factors, and
climatic factors in particular, on international migration. The channels through which climatic
factors spur emigration are many-fold, with four of them mostly considered in the literature.
First, negative climatic shocks decrease income at origin, which inﬂuences wjt, through a
decline in wages or a rise in the employment rate. Second, the shocks might increase bilateral
migration costs cjkt if they destroy assets, thus making credit constraints more binding. Third,
detrimental climatic shocks tend to decrease attractiveness at origin independently from income
(for instance, because of an increase in morbidity), which in turn leads to emigration. A fourth
channel can be called the volatility channel: if climatic conditions become more volatile, then
this can increase the volatility of wjt, inducing risk-averse people to opt for migration.
Most of the empirical literature linking climatic factors and migration has operated in mod-
els of monodic migration ﬂows (see, for instance, Marchiori et al., 2012), as opposed to dya-
dic ﬂows which is the basic unit of analysis in gravity frameworks. In general, the literature
ﬁnds much evidence in favour of a strong labour market channel but also ﬁnds compelling
evidence that in some cases, the liquidity channel is at work. In contrast with this extensive
literature on climatic shocks, there is much less work relying on gravity models of migration.
Beine and Parsons (2015) represent a noticeable exception. Their use of a longitudinal multi-
ple-origin multiple-destination data set allows the inclusion a rich combination of ﬁxed effects
for capturing unobservable factors. In particular, the inclusion of dkt ﬁxed effects allows to
control for general immigration policies. This is particularly important since the main effects
of climatic factors are supposed to operate in South–North (and South–South) international
migration. Immigration policies in developed countries are expected to be quite restrictive for
prospective migrants coming from less developed countries, the areas that are the most
17 The general presentation of the project and an analysis of preliminary data are exposed in Burgoon
et al. (2013).
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adversely affected by climatic shocks. Beine and Parsons (2015) ﬁnd support in favour of a
strong labour market channel in South–North migration, but reject the so-called amenity
channel.
b. Dyadic Factors
The dyadic factors that inﬂuence migration costs cjkt can be both time-invariant, such as
linguistic and cultural proximity, and time-varying factors, such as bilateral migration policies
and networks. We cover these factors in reverse order.
(i) Networks
An extensive literature has been devoted to the role of migration networks on the magni-
tude and the shape of bilateral migration ﬂows.18 The role of networks has been analysed in
micro-founded gravity models such as (4); while there are obviously econometric challenges
to be overcome in order to correctly estimate that effect, the few existing papers based on
structural gravity models (Beine et al., 2011a; Beine and Parsons, 2015; Bertoli and Fernan-
dez-Huertas Moraga, 2015) come up with quite consensual results:19 a 10 per cent increase in
the bilateral migration stock leads to a 4 per cent increase in the bilateral migration ﬂow over
the next ten years. This elasticity increases to 0.7 when we restrict our attention to migration
to OECD destinations, and it is higher for low-educated than for high-educated migrants, thus
lowering the average level of education of the migrants.20 We can also notice that the share
of explained variability by structural gravity models of migration is in the range of 50 to 70
per cent, and at least one-third of that proportion can be ascribed to the network effect. Fail-
ure to account for networks can lead to an omitted variable bias. This is well illustrated by
the role of colonial links. Once accounted for the network effect, regressions based on micro-
founded gravity models such as (4) fail to ﬁnd any remaining role for colonial links.
(ii) Bilateral Immigration Policies
Two broad types of measures capturing bilateral policies have been used in the literature.
First, one can capture the prevalence of bilateral agreements between countries: for instance,
Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2013) ﬁnd larger bilateral migration ﬂows
when both the origin and the destination country are signatories of the Schengen
agreement,21 and Beine et al. (2013) provide similar evidence for the bilateral agreements
between OECD countries collected by the IOM. The second main measure relates to bilat-
eral visa policies. Visa waivers, which do not belong de iure to the legal framework that
regulates immigrants’ admission at destination, can facilitate the legal entry of migrants, thus
reducing the bilateral migration costs cjkt, and also reﬂect a preferential treatment at the dya-
dic level. Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) provide evidence on the impact of
18 For classical examples of a microeconomic analyses of the role of migrants’ networks, which are not
covered here, see Munshi (2003) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010).
19 Additional evidence is also provided by Dreher and Poutvaara (2011); Beine et al. (2014) and Peder
sen et al. (2008).
20 This aggregate effect can be decomposed into an assimilation channel, for example decrease in policy
unrelated migration costs such as information and adaptation costs, and into a policy related effect, with
Beine et al. (2011b) proposing an identiﬁcation strategy to disentangle the two channels.
21 Ortega and Peri (2013) provide similar evidence, but their Schengen dummy is not bilateral, as it is
based only on the signatory status of the destination country.
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visa waivers on bilateral migration ﬂows to Spain in a speciﬁcation that uses high-frequency
migration data and controls for time-varying bilateral unobservables, including cultural prox-
imity, through a rich structure of ﬁxed effects. Similar evidence is provided by Bertoli and
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015) and Beine and Parsons (2015), with this latter paper using
longitudinal data on bilateral visa policies collected by the DEMIG project at Oxford
University.22
(iii) Linguistic and Cultural Proximity
As in the trade literature, the most important time-invariant dyadic components of bilateral
migration costs cjkt are bilateral distance, colonial links, linguistic and cultural proximity.
Bilateral distance does not require much explanation. As discussed above, the inﬂuence of
colonial links can be indirectly captured through the network effect. This is in contrast with
linguistic proximity that exerts some additional effect beyond its inﬂuence through networks.
Most of the analysis based on gravity equations and covered here capture the role of lan-
guages either through the use of dummies for the existence of a common (ofﬁcial or spoken)
language between j and k, or through some simple measures of linguistic proximity. More
elaborated indicators of linguistic proximity have been nevertheless used in gravity equations:
Belot and Ederveen (2012) and Adsera and Pytlikova (2012) employ various measures of
proximity, based either on family trees established by linguists or on measures of phonetic
similarity between languages. This captures the fact that Italian prospective migrants can more
easily become proﬁcient in the local language in either Spain or France than in Japan,
although Italy does not share a common language with any of these three destinations. Cul-
tural proximity is a more elusive concept than linguistic proximity. Belot and Ederveen
(2012) use particular measures capturing, at least partly, this dimension: these are variables
describing bilateral religious distance and survey-based measures capturing the cultural orien-
tation of countries, both fostering bilateral migration ﬂows
5. CONCLUSIONS
The use of bilateral data for the analysis of international migration is at the same time a
blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because the dyadic dimension of the data allows to ana-
lyse many previously unaddressed questions of the literature. The development and the use of
country-pair ﬂows and stocks of international migration allow to identify many important
determinants such as the network effect, the role of poverty constraints or the impact of cul-
tural links between countries. This paper reviews some of the recent studies using this type of
data to identify factors affecting international migration ﬂows. Our review demonstrates that
signiﬁcant efforts have been conducted by many scholars and that overall we have a much
better knowledge of the main determinants.
Still, the use of bilateral data is also a curse. The methodological challenges that are
implied by the use of this type of data are numerous, and our paper covers some of the most
important ones. We show that a good connection with the underlying micro-foundations is
22 As for the results of income, the heterogeneity in the speciﬁcations prevents us from comparing the
typical estimated elasticities obtained in the literature. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Bertoli
and Fernandez Huertas Moraga (2015) ﬁnd that the imposition of a bilateral visa requirement tends to
decrease the size of the bilateral migration ﬂow over a period of 10 years by around 45 per cent. This is
in line with Beine and Parsons (2015).
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desirable, something very much in line with the literature on trade. The reference to the
underlying theoretical frameworks such as the RUM model clariﬁes the need to account for
important issues such as multilateral resistance to migration. In turn, this has strong implica-
tions for the econometric estimation methods that need to be used. Additional issues such as
the presence of many zero observations or endogeneity concerns due to omitted factors have
also strong implications for the choice of the appropriate econometric techniques. Fortunately,
the recent evolution of the literature suggests that scholars are increasingly aware of these
challenges.
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